Issuance of New Credit Cards in Russia Falls by 7.5% in a Month
In April 2026, Russians took out 1.29 million new credit cards, down 7.5% from March, reflecting the ongoing tight monetary policy and high retail product rates.
Here is a detailed analytical piece written from the perspective of an industry insider.
Credit Cards Lose Appeal: Why the 7.5% Drop in Issuance Is Not Seasonal but a Structural Shift in the Retail Risk Market
The Core: What Is Really Happening
The formal decline in the number of credit cards issued in April 2026 by 7.5% compared to March is just the tip of the iceberg. The real story is that the Russian retail lending market has finally split into two circuits. In the first circuit, banks continue to lend to high-quality borrowers with low debt burdens, while in the second, a mass of "rejected" borrowers is accumulating, rapidly migrating to microfinance organizations and the shadow sector.
The main alarm signal is hidden not in the figure of 1.29 million cards issued, but in the stagnation of the average credit limit. The indicator has stabilized around 100,000 rubles (approximately $1,380 at the current exchange rate). Banks are deliberately shrinking limits despite the nominal rise in consumer prices. In dollar terms, the available limit for cardholders has decreased by about 11-13% compared to the same period in 2025, directly indicating a decline in the financial system's risk appetite. Credit institutions have stopped viewing cards as a market share capture tool, turning them into a product for retaining the premium segment.
The second structural shift that the mass media has yet to notice is the widening gap between the capital regions and the provinces. In Moscow, issuance fell by only 2.8%, while in the Voronezh region, the decline reached 13.3%, in Stavropol Krai — 12.9%, and in the Orenburg region — 10.7%. This is not just statistical noise but evidence that banks are scaling back expansion in regions where real incomes are not keeping up with inflation and scoring models are producing more negative decisions.
Timeline and Context
The current downturn is not an isolated episode; it fits into the logic of monetary policy tightening that began in late 2024.
Second Half of 2024: The Central Bank introduces macroprudential limits on the debt-to-income ratio (DTI) and sharply raises the key rate to cool the overheated credit market. This is the first blow to the credit card segment, which historically grew due to borrowers with high debt burdens.
January 2026: The market hits bottom. The United Credit Bureau records the lowest monthly issuance figure in four years — just 969,440 credit cards. The total cost of credit for cards reaches 50.38%, comparable to microfinance sector rates.
February-March 2026: A rebound occurs. In February, the retail lending market partially recovers, with credit cards accounting for 14.4% of total issuance. March becomes a peak month: retail lending overall jumps 38% year-on-year, partly due to pent-up demand.
April 2026: The growth stalls. The number of new cards falls 7.5% from March, although year-on-year growth remains at 17.9%. This paradox is explained by the low base effect: in April 2025, the market was at its lows after the initial shock of the Central Bank's policy tightening.
May 2026: The key rate remains at 16% with prospects of a cut to 15.5% in June. The total cost of credit for cards remains at a prohibitive level, continuing to pressure demand. NBKI confirms: banks are tightening scoring filters, limiting both card issuance and average limits.
Who Wins and Who Loses
Winners:
- Banks with strong payroll projects (Sber, VTB, T-Bank). They gain access to client income data and can assess risk more accurately. In the context of the Central Bank's tight policy, this becomes a critical advantage, allowing portfolio growth without compromising quality.
- Microfinance organizations (MFOs). These are the main beneficiaries of regulatory compression in the banking sector. The share of "rejected" borrowers moving from banks to MFOs rose from 8% to nearly 15% by early 2025. In the first half of 2025, MFO loan issuance increased by 61%, and the portfolio exceeded 700 billion rubles (about $9.65 billion). In 2026, this trend accelerated: each new credit card rejection pushes the borrower toward more expensive and riskier borrowing.
- Holders of foreign currency savings. Against the backdrop of shrinking ruble retail lending and the expected weakening of the ruble to 82-83 per dollar by year-end, those holding savings in USD or EUR benefit. Their purchasing power within Russia grows, while ruble borrowers lose access to cheap credit.
Losers:
- Regional borrowers with average debt burdens. This category has become the victim of stricter scoring. Banks are reducing their presence in regions where median incomes cannot support debt servicing at current rates. In the Voronezh, Orenburg regions and Stavropol, issuance declines are in double digits.
- Retail chains reliant on credit traffic. A credit card generates a digital footprint and ensures non-cash turnover easily tracked by tax authorities. When card issuance falls and limits shrink, retail chains lose turnover. Part of consumer demand shifts to cash turnover, which is harder to control.
- The Central Bank itself — in the long term. Formally, the regulator protects citizens from over-indebtedness, but in practice, it pushes them toward more expensive and riskier loans. The share of overdue loans among MFO clients has already reached 31%. This creates a "debt trap" for millions of Russians, the social consequences of which the state will have to deal with.
What the Media Is Not Saying
Insider Insight One: Credit cards whiten the economy, and their contraction expands the gray zone.
This is the least obvious aspect of what is happening. A credit card is a non-cash payment tool that leaves a digital footprint. Every transaction is visible to tax authorities and contributes to the white turnover of retail. Cash loans, on the other hand, are a "black box": receiving 300-500 thousand rubles in cash (about $4,140–6,900), people can channel them into the gray zone — paying for repairs, services, or market goods off the books. Economists from the Telegram channel "Black Swan" directly point out: cash feeds the shadow sector, while credit cards forcibly whiten turnover. When the Central Bank restricts card issuance, it unwittingly expands the field for unaccounted economic activity. By some estimates, up to 30-40% of funds received in cash may be spent outside the tax system.
Insider Insight Two: MFO statistics are a hidden indicator of future defaults in the banking system.
The 61% growth in the MFO portfolio and the increase in clients by 3.2 million people are not an isolated phenomenon. Many of these borrowers already have loans or cards with banks. When a client starts servicing a loan at 1% per day from an MFO, their ability to pay bank obligations drops sharply. This means that in 6-9 months, banks will see a rise in overdue loans in their own portfolios, not due to macroeconomic deterioration but because their former clients have fallen into the microfinance trap. Banks created the problem by rejecting clients, but they will pay for it with the same impairment reserves.
Insider Insight Three: The average limit of 100,000 rubles (about $1,380) is a psychological barrier beyond which a credit card loses its meaning for the consumer.
With average regional salaries of 40-50 thousand rubles ($550–690), a limit of 100,000 rubles covers only two to three average salaries. For comparison, in 2024, the average limit reached 112-115 thousand rubles. The 11-13% reduction in dollar terms means that the credit card ceases to be a tool for large purchases and becomes a means to get by until payday. This undermines the banks' business model, which relied on interest income from long-term revolving use of the limit.
Forecast: Next 30 Days and 90 Days
30-Day Horizon (until June 18, 2026).
In the coming month, the key event will be the Central Bank of the Russian Federation's rate meeting. A cut to 15.5% is expected, but this is insufficient to revive the credit card market. The total cost of credit for cards, which stood at 50.38% in January, will remain in the 42-48% range, continuing to shut out the mass borrower. In May-June, card issuance will stabilize at 1.25-1.35 million units per month — the decline will stop, but there will be no growth. Banks will continue to compete for the premium segment, keeping the average limit around 100,000 rubles ($1,380).
MFOs during this period will continue to grow their portfolio at a rate of 10-15% month-on-month, attracting those whom banks have rejected for cards. The overdue loan share in the MFO sector could reach 33-34%.
90-Day Horizon (until August 17, 2026).
In summer, the credit card market will enter a stagnation phase. If the Central Bank continues its rate-cutting cycle and brings the rate to 14-14.5% by August, the total cost of credit for cards will drop below 40% — a psychological threshold at which some borrowers will start returning to banks. Issuance could grow by 5-8% relative to the April low, reaching 1.35-1.45 million cards per month.
However, the main risk for the market is not rates but hidden overdue loans. By August, the effect of the client flow to MFOs in late 2025 and early 2026 will become noticeable: banks will start setting aside additional reserves for portfolio impairment, forcing them to tighten scoring even further. A vicious circle will emerge: there will be almost no quality borrowers left, and those who formally pass scoring are already overloaded with MFO debts. Under these conditions, the credit card segment risks showing the first signs of NPL (non-performing loans) growth to 12-14% of the portfolio.
In dollar terms, the credit card market volume will continue to shrink. If the exchange rate reaches 82-83 rubles per dollar, the average limit in foreign currency will fall below $1,200, returning the market to 2022 levels. The only bright spot will remain the payroll clients of the largest banks — they will be lent at individual rates, effectively subsidizing the card business through other products.
— Editorial Team
