Bloomberg: Saudi Arabia and Qatar Refuse to Join War Against Iran at UAE's Request
Amid Iranian missile strikes on targets in the Persian Gulf, the UAE president tried to persuade Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join a military response, but the Gulf leaders refused, calling this conflict not their war.
The refusal of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join a coordinated military coalition against Iran is not just a diplomatic demarche. It marks the final collapse of the Persian Gulf security architecture built by the US half a century ago. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981 precisely as a response to the threat from the Islamic Revolution, has de facto ceased to function as a defense alliance.
The Core: What's Really Happening
Formally, Bloomberg reports that UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), after US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, held a series of phone calls with Gulf leaders, insisting on a collective military response. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Emir of Qatar both replied the same way: "This is not our war."
But the real background runs much deeper. The Gulf states, which lived under the US security umbrella for decades, have for the first time faced a situation where that umbrella does not protect but instead attracts strikes. Iranian missiles and drones hit ports, airports, residential areas, and energy infrastructure across the Gulf. Countries that had spent years trying to build relations with Tehran to stabilize the region and attract investment suddenly found themselves at the epicenter of a war they did not want and had tried to prevent.
Key point: The refusal from Riyadh and Doha was addressed not only to Abu Dhabi but also to Washington. One source directly stated that the Trump administration wanted Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join the UAE strikes. Thus, the refusal was twofold: to a GCC ally and to the senior security partner.
Timeline and Context
The chain of events unfolded rapidly. On February 28, the US and Israel struck Iran. MBZ immediately expressed readiness to cooperate with Washington and Jerusalem. In early March and April, the UAE independently carried out limited strikes on Iranian territory.
Saudi Arabia also attacked Iran in March but then sharply changed course—it turned to Pakistan to act as a mediator in dialogue between the US and Iran. Qatar, whose Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas plant was damaged by an Iranian attack in mid-March, considered retaliatory measures but chose to focus on de-escalation.
The result of the refusal was a sharp deterioration in already tense relations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This was followed by a demonstrative move: from May 1, the UAE officially left OPEC. This decision was motivated not only by economic considerations but also by outright resentment—Abu Dhabi felt that its cartel partners had abandoned it at a critical moment.
Who Wins and Who Loses
Iran becomes the main strategic beneficiary of the split. Tehran has spent decades trying to drive a wedge between the Gulf monarchies, and now this goal has been achieved without a single shot on the diplomatic front. A fractured GCC is unable to form a unified deterrence front—exactly what Tehran wanted.
In the short term, the UAE has strengthened military cooperation with Israel: intelligence sharing, joint detection and interception of Iranian attacks, and coordination on targets in Iranian territory. But strategically, Abu Dhabi finds itself isolated among its Arab neighbors, making it more vulnerable to future attacks.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar win in the short term by avoiding direct involvement in the war. But their refusal sets a dangerous precedent: if the GCC does not respond collectively to an attack on one of its members, the alliance becomes a fiction. Every subsequent crisis will test this precedent.
The smaller monarchies—Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman—lose. Bahrain and Kuwait, which usually coordinate with Saudi Arabia, remained on the sidelines of the conflict but are deprived of both Saudi protection and Emirati resolve. Oman, which traditionally maintains warmer relations with Iran, was not even considered a candidate for participation in the strikes.
The United States loses, as its regional security architecture proved ineffective at the moment of real threat. The fact that the UAE—the most pro-American Gulf monarchy—could not convince its partners to act testifies to a fundamental erosion of American influence.
What the Media Leaves Out
The first non-obvious insight concerns the true motives behind the Saudi refusal. Publicly, Riyadh cites a desire to avoid escalation, but the real reason is deeper. Saudi Arabia invested significant diplomatic efforts in normalizing relations with Iran through Chinese mediation in 2023-2025, and a full-scale war would have negated those investments. But there is also a financial dimension: according to MSCI, in the first three weeks of the conflict, real estate stocks in the Gulf fell by 22%, and UAE corporate spreads widened by 55%. Saudi Arabia, whose Vision 2030 program critically depends on foreign investment and tourism, simply cannot afford a prolonged war—the economic consequences would be catastrophic.
The second point is a tectonic shift in the balance of power. Gulf states hold approximately $2 trillion in US assets through sovereign wealth funds. Refusing to join the military coalition means these countries are beginning to reconsider the fundamental assumption underlying the petrodollar system since 1974: US military protection in exchange for recycling petrodollars into US Treasury bonds. If Riyadh and Doha no longer trust US security guarantees, why should they continue to finance US debt? One Gulf official already stated in March that three of the four largest GCC economies are reviewing the positions of their sovereign funds.
The third insight relates to the UAE's exit from OPEC. The media presents this as an economic decision, but Bloomberg sources directly link it to Abu Dhabi's resentment toward its Gulf partners. This is the first time in the cartel's history that a geopolitical split has led to a major producer's exit. The consequences for the oil market are fundamental: OPEC loses not just 3 million barrels per day of quota but also its status as a monolithic cartel. The next 12 months will show whether anyone else follows the Emirates' example—Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia itself.
Forecast: Next 30 and 90 Days
Next 30 days (by June 16). The GCC will maintain formal unity, but internal cracks will deepen. The UAE will continue independent limited strikes on Iranian targets in coordination with Israel, but without Saudi support. Saudi Arabia will intensify mediation efforts through Pakistan and possibly China. Qatar will try to play the role of a neutral mediator, using its ties with Tehran. Brent will remain in the $105-112 range, as the GCC split is offset by continued Iranian attacks and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Next 90 days (by August 16). Baseline scenario (55% probability): The GCC will de facto split into two camps—"hawks" led by the UAE, coordinating with Israel, and "doves" led by Saudi Arabia, seeking a ceasefire through mediators. This will not be a formal break, but joint military operations will become impossible. Oil markets will price in a permanent Gulf fragmentation premium of $15-20 per barrel.
Negative scenario (30%): The UAE leaves the GCC or suspends its membership. Abu Dhabi has already demonstrated a willingness to take drastic steps by leaving OPEC. If Iranian attacks on the Emirates continue and Gulf partners do not provide support, the split could become formal. This would be a geopolitical earthquake on the scale of the 2017 diplomatic rift with Qatar.
Catastrophic scenario (15%): Saudi Arabia, in response to Iranian attacks, nevertheless enters the war, but not in coalition with the UAE—independently. This would lead to a chaotic conflict without coordination, where each player pursues its own goals, increasing the war's duration and damage to all sides. Brent in this scenario would rise to $125-130. The regional security architecture built over half a century would finally become a thing of the past.
— Editorial Team
