CBR Reports Drop in Bank Correspondent Account Balances to RUB 5.2 Trillion
Balances of credit institutions on correspondent accounts with the Bank of Russia fell to RUB 5,197 billion on May 28, down from RUB 5,395.1 billion the previous day.
Headline: Correspondent Accounts Drop to RUB 5.2 Trillion: Why the CBR Is Calm and Banks Brace for a Storm
Author: Independent Financial Analyst (Insider Perspective)
[The Gist]: What's Really Happening
On May 28, 2026, the Bank of Russia published routine statistics: balances of credit institutions on correspondent accounts fell to RUB 5,197 billion across the Russian Federation (of which RUB 4,989.7 billion in the Moscow region). The day before, it was RUB 5,395.1 billion. The daily drop was RUB 198 billion, or 3.7%.
At first glance, nothing special. Correspondent accounts fluctuate daily. But a professional eye sees the beginning of an important trend that the general public and most journalists will miss.
The real insight: the decline in correspondent account balances, coupled with a simultaneous decline in deposit account balances (from RUB 3,689.65 billion to RUB 3,641.78 billion), means banks are not just shifting money from one pocket to another. They are actively repaying debt to the CBR under repo operations. This changes the entire liquidity picture.
Timeline and Context
Early May 2026. Correspondent accounts are at historically high levels. On May 6, they stood at RUB 5,659.7 billion. On May 7, RUB 5,177.8 billion. This is the peak after the tax payment period, when money accumulated in bank accounts.
Mid-May. Correspondent account balances fluctuate around RUB 5,400-5,900 billion. As of May 14, they were RUB 5,896.7 billion.
May 27-28. A sharp drop of RUB 198 billion in one day.
What changed? The key date is May 19, 2026, when the CBR held a weekly repo auction with a limit of RUB 4,410 billion. Banks actively borrowed from the regulator. But by May 27-28, these borrowings began to be repaid—the weekly repo was maturing.
Simply put: banks borrowed money from the CBR against securities, and now they are repaying it. And they are repaying not for no reason, but because they have liquidity from other sources.
Who Wins and Who Loses
The obvious winner: The Central Bank. When banks repay repo debt, the CBR shrinks its balance sheet and reduces risks associated with collateral. Moreover, the decline in correspondent accounts means banks hold less "expensive" money—funds on which they pay interest to depositors but which are not working in loans.
The less obvious winner: The government, through tax revenue mechanisms. Why did banks suddenly have liquidity to repay repos? Because the peak of tax payments (April) has passed, and money has returned to the banking system. Large corporate clients, having paid taxes in April, now received new budget allocations and placed them in bank accounts. Banks do not hold this money as dead weight—they use it to repay expensive debt to the CBR.
Losers: Banks that depend on CBR refinancing. The reduction in limits at repo auctions (from RUB 4,780 billion in mid-May to RUB 4,410 billion at the May 19 auction) means the CBR is gradually tightening liquidity provision conditions. This is part of its policy of "normalizing" monetary conditions after the rate-cutting cycle. Banks accustomed to cheap CBR money will have to find alternative sources—client deposits, interbank market, bond issuance.
But there is also a hidden loser: retail borrowers. Because when banks lose access to cheap funding from the CBR, they raise loan rates. Even if the key rate remains at 14.5%, bank margins can widen by increasing spreads.
What the Media Isn't Saying
The first insight missing from headlines: the RUB 198 billion daily drop in correspondent accounts is an anomaly, but not a crisis. The crisis lies elsewhere: in the structural liquidity deficit that the CBR hides behind nice numbers.
According to CBR methodology, the liquidity deficit as of May 14, 2026, was RUB 1,735.6 billion. This means banks lack nearly RUB 1.74 trillion to cover their liabilities without borrowing from the regulator. They cover this deficit through repo operations—borrowing from the CBR against OFZ bonds and other securities.
The CBR is fine with this. It controls the rate, collateral volume, and terms. Moreover, it earns interest on this. But for banks, this means chronic dependence on the CBR's "needle." And as soon as the regulator starts tightening collateral requirements or reducing limits—which it is already doing, judging by auction dynamics (the limit fell from RUB 4,780 billion to RUB 4,410 billion in a week)—banks will find themselves in an extremely vulnerable position.
The second insight that goes unmentioned: correspondent accounts at RUB 5.2 trillion are still very high by historical standards, and this is a bad sign for inflation.
According to CEIC data, the historical peak of correspondent accounts was reached on September 15, 2023—RUB 12,127.5 billion. The current level of RUB 5,197 billion is about 43% of that peak. But even this level is 2-3 times higher than the "normal" values of 2019-2021 (when correspondent accounts fluctuated around RUB 1,500-2,500 billion).
Why is this bad? Because excess liquidity in correspondent accounts is a direct driver of inflation. Banks can at any moment channel this money into loans, fueling consumer demand. The CBR, aware of this, has been trying for several months to "sterilize" liquidity—through deposit auctions and reducing repo limits. The RUB 198 billion daily drop in correspondent accounts is a result of this policy. But the pace of decline is still insufficient.
The third point that is overlooked: behind correspondent account operations lies a hidden game between the Ministry of Finance and the CBR.
The Ministry of Finance wants a weak ruble (to boost budget revenues from oil and gas) and low rates (to service government debt). The CBR wants stability and inflation control. When the Ministry places new borrowings (OFZ), it attracts money from the market, and correspondent accounts decline. When it spends budget funds, correspondent accounts rise.
Currently, correspondent accounts are declining—meaning the Ministry is attracting more than it spends. This is an indirect sign that the government is preparing for new large expenditures (likely defense-related) in the next 1-2 months. And it needs money now, not later.
Forecast: Next 30 Days and 90 Days
30 days: In June, correspondent accounts will continue to decline, but more smoothly—by RUB 50-100 billion per week. By the end of the month, balances could reach RUB 4,800-4,900 billion. The key factor is the CBR rate meeting on June 18. If the rate stays at 14.5%, banks will retain access to refinancing under current conditions. If the CBR surprises and raises rates (unlikely, but possible if inflation accelerates), correspondent accounts could crash to RUB 4,000-4,200 billion within days.
90 days: By the end of Q3, the situation will depend on two variables: tax revenues and budget expenditures. Base scenario (60%): The Ministry of Finance continues to actively borrow in the market, correspondent accounts decline to RUB 3,500-4,000 billion. Banks will be forced to rely more on client deposits, pushing deposit rates to 17-19% per annum (currently 14-16%). Alternative scenario (40%): If geopolitical tensions ease and oil falls below $85 per barrel, the Ministry will receive less revenue, borrowings will decrease, and correspondent accounts could even rise to RUB 5,500 billion.
A particular risk is the "overhang" of OFZ bonds on the market. By year-end, the Ministry needs to place bonds worth over RUB 3 trillion to cover the deficit. If demand from banks proves insufficient, the CBR will have to buy OFZ directly (effectively turning on the printing press). This would cause a sharp rise in correspondent accounts to RUB 7,000-8,000 billion and accelerate inflation to 7-8% per annum.
Editorial Forecast
Based on current data, we believe that in the next 24–72 hours, the dynamics of correspondent accounts will put pressure on money market rates RUONIA and MosPrime. We expect a slight increase in rates of 10-20 basis points (to 14.7-14.9% per annum), as declining liquidity traditionally pushes rates up. The key RUONIA benchmark for tomorrow is 14.65-14.75%. Confidence level is medium, as sudden liquidity injections from the CBR through deposit auctions could push rates back down. The main risk is an unexpected announcement from the Ministry of Finance about large budget expenditures, which would boost liquidity and crash rates by 30-50 basis points. This is the editorial opinion, not an investment recommendation.
— Editorial Team
